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sports.35 The hearings of the subcommittee have been completed, but
as of this writing, no report has been published of its recommendations.
ROBERT G. WEBB
Constitutional Law-Limits on Power of Congressional Investigation
In Watkins v. United States1 the Supreme Court of the United
States again considered the constitutional limits on the power of con-
gressional investigation. In that case a labor union organizer was
questioned by a subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-American
Activities. The Committee's authorizing resolution2 directed it to in-
vestigate "un-American propaganda activities." The witness was will-
ing to and did divulge his past political activities and the activities of
those whom he believed were still members of the communist party.
However, while disclaiming the privilege against self-incrimination, he
refused to tell whether he knew certain named persons (some of whom
were not connected with labor) to have been members of the com-
munist party, because he believed that they were not members at the
time of the investigation. He was indicted and convicted for "contempt
of Congress." The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
affirmed 4 the conviction and held that it was proper for the trial court
to exclude evidence5 offered by the defendant to prove that the Com-
mittee claimed a power of exposure independent of the legislative func-
tion and was interrogating him pursuant to this claimed power. The
Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals on other grounds. 6
In the trial court and in the court of appeals the defendant argued
$ H.R. 6876, 6877, 8023, 8124, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). These four sports
are baseball, football, basketball, and hockey.
1354 U.S. 178 (1957).
Act of Aug. 2, 1946, c. 753, 60 STAT. 812 (codified in scattered sections of 2,
5, 15, 31, 33, 34, 40, 44 U.S.C.).
152 STAT. 942 (1938), 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1952).;
'233 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
' The trial court excluded statements from house committee reports, house com-
mittee hearings, the Congressional Record, and newspapers to the effect that the
Committee asserted an independent power of exposure. Also excluded was evidence
offered to prove that the Committee already had in its possession the information
that it sought to acquire from defendant.
6 There were two principal reasons for reversal. First, the vagueness of the
Committee authorizing resolution inadequately safeguarded against the dissipation
of constitutional freedoms because of the impossibility of: (1) weighing congres-
sional need against private rights; (2) determining pertinency; (3) the Commit-
tee's limiting its questioning to statutory pertinency. Second, the vagueness of
the authorizing resolution denied the witness notice of the subject of the investiga-
tion with the same degree of exactness required by the due process clause in the
expression of any element of a criminal offense.
This latter reason raises a question of comparing investigating committee hear-
ings with criminal trials for purposes of the due process requirement of certainty




that the exposure motive of the committee negated a valid legislative
purpose for investigation. This theory has been argued in the lower
federal courts with conflicting results, raising the questions of whether:
(1) a congressional investigation may have exposure as its principal
goal ;7 (2) a court has authority to scrutinize congressional or committee
motives ;8 (3) a legitimate purpose is conclusively presumed when the
subject of the investigation is one concerning which Congress may
validly legislate ;9 (4) the validity of the legislative purpose can be de-
termined by committee motives;1° (5) a committee investigation is in-
validated by an improper committee purpose. 1
The Watkins case only partially answered these questions. In com-
menting on the exclusion of the evidence, the Court indicated that
although there is no power in Congress to expose for exposure's sake,
the purpose of Congress is not to be tested by examining committee
motives. The Court then asserted that committee "motives alone would
not vitiate an investigation which had been instituted by a House of
Congress if that assembly's legislative purpose is being served."'1 2 The
statement by its terms applies only when the legislative purpose is
served. Thus it sheds little light on the problem of determining whether
the Supreme Court will recognize improper committee motivation as
being so gross that the legislative purpose is not being served. The his-
torical development of limitations on the power of investigation may
illuminate this problem.
More than three quarters of a century ago in Kilbourn v. Thomp-
so 1' 3 the Court pointed out that Congress does not "possess the general
power of making inquiry into the private affairs of the citizen."'14 Thus
if a witness is to be compelled to answer there must be a valid legisla-
I1n United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 1947), the court re-
fused to decide "whether a congressional investigation may have exposure as its
principal goal."
'In Eisler v. United States, 179 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. dismissed per
curiam, 338 U.S. 883 (1949), the court .ruled that it had no authority to scrutinize
congressional or committee motives.
'In Morford v. United States, 176 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir. 1949), the court ruled
that a legitimate purpose is presumed when the subject of investigation is one
concerning which Congress can validly legislate. Cf. Barenblatt v. United States,
240 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1957), rev'd per curiam, 354 U.S. 930 (1957), where the
court ruled that evidence of a committee exposure motive, which does not negate
other legitimate purposes of inquiry, does not rebut the presumption that con-
gressional investigations have valid legislative purposes.
"
0In United States v. Icardi, 140 F. Supp. 383 (D.C. Cir. 1956), the Com-
mittee called a witness for an improper purpose and the court held that the Com-
mittee was not pursuing a valid legislative purpose and directed a verdict of
acquittal.
" See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
'72Id. at 200.
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tive purpose,15 and questions asked must be pertinent to the matter un-
der inquiry.16 When the investigation is by committee, the pertinency
of questions is "determined by reference to the scope of the authority
vested in the committee"'17 by its authorizing resolution. Also, the con-
gressional need for the information sought must be weighed against
rights secured to the witness by the first amendment.' 8
It seems logical that there would be no congressional need for an
investigation if the principal goal of the committee were public exposure
of the individual's political beliefs or past associations. Since Congress
has no power to expose for exposure's sake, this should be true because
Congress ought not to be able legally to conduct an investigation by
committee which it could not legally conduct itself. Congress could
have no legitimate need for information which it could not legally
acquire. By this view, Watkins might have been decided on the
ground that the evidence of improper committee motivation should have
been admitted in order to give the defendant an opportunity to prove
that he was convicted pursuant to an invalid investigation.
GASTON H. GAGE
Criminal Law-Offense of Driving Under the Influence of Intoxicating
Liquor When Vehicle Is Motionless
In 1955, 1,165 persons met death by accident on North Carolina
highways.' This placed North Carolina eighth in the nation in total
highway accident deaths, and eleventh in deaths per vehicle-miles
traveled 2-- figures which are representative of North Carolina's accident
rate for recent years.3 Of these 1,165 accidental deaths, approximately
ten per cent may be attributed to the effects of alcohol.4 These simple
figures indicate the gravity of North Carolina's highway "alcohol-
accident" problem and the pressing need for some effective corrective
action. It will be the purpose of this Note to consider one area of the
" Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929); Barry v. United States ex
rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1928); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135
(1926) ; In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1896).
10 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1926).
'7 Sinclair v. United, States, 279 U.S. 263, 299 (1929) ; Barry v. United States
ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597, 613 (1928) (dictum).
"
8 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88 (1939); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1939); Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) ; Shenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1918).
NEW YoRK HERALn TRIBUNE, THE Woaw ALMANaC 367 (1957).
Ibid.8 Id., 1945-55.
'The ingestion of enough alcohol to give a blood content of between 0.10 and
0.15 per cent alcohol (which is for most people five or six cocktails) multiplies
the chances of a person's having an accident by three. If the blood content of
alcohol goes above 0.15 per cent, a person's chances of having an accident are
multiplied by ten. Traffic Review & Digest, Aug. 1954, p. 2.
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